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Abstract 
 
How might political ideology help to shape an organizational field? We explore the 
discursive construction of the multinational hotel industry through analysis of one of its 
leading actors, Hilton International (HI), conceived by Conrad Hilton as a means of 
combatting communism by facilitating world peace through international trade and travel. 
While the politicized rhetoric employed at hotel openings reflected institutional diversity, it 
resonated in parallel with a strong anti-communist discourse. We show that through astute 
political sensemaking and sensegiving, macro-political discourse which is ideological and 
universalising may be allied to micro-political practices in strategic action fields. Our study 
illuminates the processes of early-stage post-war globalization and its accompanying 
discourses, demonstrating that the foundation of a global industry may be ideologically 
inspired. Our primary contribution to theory is specific acknowledgement of the importance 
of political ideology as a particular ‘social skill’, helping to determine how international 
business has been ‘won’. 
  
Keywords 
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Introduction 
Recognition by mainstream scholars of organization studies and international business that 
multinational corporations (MNCs) are fundamentally politicized organizational forms has 
 
 
been slow to develop (Morgan and Kristensen, 2006). Recently, however, a new 
understanding has begun to emerge that politics and power have played a significant role in 
the construction, evolution and social existence of MNCs (Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2009; 
Geppert et al., 2016; Maclean and Hollinshead). This has contributed to a heightened 
awareness that political action by key social actors is informed by their institutional 
backgrounds, identities, interests and ideologies (Geppert and Dörrenbächer, 2011).  
To reach a more complete understanding of MNCs as politicized entities, however, 
more research is needed on the discourse and interaction of power-holders in pursuing 
internationalization (Hillman, 2003; Hillman and Hitt, 1999). MNCs are politicized according 
to the discursive positioning of their leading actors. Power is expressed through discourse, 
which moulds dominant ideologies in institutional fields (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). 
Ideological discourses serve as vehicles for political strategizing through which actors strive 
to extend their reach, frame issues, motivate constituencies and create order (Clark and 
Geppert, 2006; Clegg, 1989). Yet in the field of international business, ideology is often so 
taken for granted and subsumed in the apparent ‘natural’ order of things that it fails to attract 
the attention it merits. The historical case we consider here benefits from an ideological 
discourse that is explicit and fully articulated.  
 This paper examines the role of political ideology in shaping an organizational field 
by exploring the discursive construction of the multinational hotel industry through analysis 
of one of its leading actors, Hilton International (HI) (Contractor and Kundu, 1998; Davé, 
1984; Dunning and McQueen, 1981). We examine the purposeful use of ideological rhetoric 
at Hilton Hotels Corporation (HHC) in pursuing international growth between 1947 and 1967 
through its subsidiary, HI, formed in 1948 and spun out in 1964 as a separate company 
registered on the New York Stock Exchange. Over a period of 20 years, HI expanded from a 
standing start in 1947 to 41 landmark hotels with 14,556 rooms in 1967 when it merged with 
 
 
Trans World Airlines. HI was conceived by its founder Conrad Hilton (1887‒1979) as a 
vehicle for combatting communism by constructing international hotels to boost capitalist 
economic development through business travel and tourism (HIA, 1956a). The immediate 
post-war era was a time of reconstruction, but also of rising tensions when the West and the 
freedoms it embraced appeared under threat from communism and the political and military 
expansionism of the Soviet Union. With the world seemingly split between adherents of 
Western-style capitalism and countries sympathetic to Soviet-style communism, a third group 
emerged consisting of nations that saw themselves as belonging to neither ‘camp’. The 
politicized speeches given by Hilton often targeted this non-aligned group, dubbed the 
‘uncommitted third’, whom he sought to convince of the merits of the American business 
model as a route to freedom and prosperity. In this way, our study sheds light on the 
politicized processes of early stage globalization and the ideological discourses that 
accompanied it. We follow Morgan (2011) in underscoring the political diversity of MNCs 
and corresponding ‘need to contextualize any particular MNC… within a “map” of [its] 
diversity’. Hence, we accord particular attention to macro- as well as micro-political 
challenges within what has become known as the ‘transnational social space’ (Morgan, 
2011).  
We address two guiding research questions. First, what are the political processes in 
which key actors engaged in the discursive construction and enactment of the multinational 
hotel industry? Second, how was meaning making tailored to suit the variegated political 
contexts within which HI came to operate globally? Our paper unfolds as follows. The next 
section reviews the literature on politics, power and ideological discourse in international 
business, focusing on meaning creation within a politicized organizational field. We then 
provide details of the research on which our study is founded, explaining our methodology, 
data sources and analytical methods. In our empirical section, we draw on rich archival 
 
 
material to explore the types of political activity engaged in by leading actors at HI. In doing 
so, we explore the processes of rhetorically intense argumentation, elite political networking, 
coalition building and cultivating officialdom germane to setting up hotels in disparate 
locations, and consider the meaning-making behind the political messages delivered at 
international hotel openings. In our concluding section, we discuss our findings, reflect on the 
implications of our research for the study of political ideology in informing international 
business, and consider its limitations and avenues for future research. 
 
Politics, power and discourse in international business 
Politics, power and ideology in multinational corporations 
We follow Harzing and Sorge (2003: 190) in defining MNCs as organizations that 
‘operate across borders and societies’. According to Munir (2014: 91), MNCs have served to 
sustain hegemonic propensities in international business, such that the rise of the MNC can 
be seen as a critical means through which ‘belief systems become hegemonic’, whereby 
ideology is converted into taken-for-granted logic. The tendency of MNCs to promote a 
particular worldview and thus define new courses of social action, however, is regularly 
overlooked. Yet the dynamic political systems within which markets are constructed 
‘resemble contested organizational fields in which actors struggle over the construction of 
economic relationships, governance structures, institutional rules and norms, and discursive 
frames’ (Levy, 2008: 944). The most dominant actors among them employ political and 
discursive strategies that determine the socio-political contexts within which they operate and 
compete (Clegg et al., 2006). This has been particularly apparent in the recent rise of a neo-
liberal ideology that accentuates inequalities by privileging the interests of global MNCs over 
those of nation states and societies (Kaplinsky, 2004).  
 
 
As Hardy and Phillips (1998: 218) remark, the resulting inter-organizational domain 
becomes a contested arena in which organizational fields are socially constituted and 
meanings are forged in a ‘dynamic process of contestation and accommodation’ (Levy, 2008: 
945). Hence, market positioning is inherently political, organizational boundaries and market 
construction being bound up with the setting of ideological boundaries (Levy, 2008; Santos 
and Eisenhardt, 2009). Considered thus, the expansion of organizational boundaries by core 
actors into new, unchartered territory may be seen first and foremost as a political project 
(Fligstein, 1997). Connecting such projects to the interests of other actors in the field is 
critical to their success (Hollinshead and Maclean, 2013).  
 The power relations that ensue between actors in contested inter-organizational fields 
are therefore not entirely one way. While power in the contested transnational social space is 
‘structurally weighted in favour of the MNC’ (Clark and Geppert, 2006: 340), conventional 
dominant actors must take account of other actors in the field who have a bearing on the 
success of their projects, inter alia through their power to block them by mobilizing 
resistance (Fleming and Spicer, 2007; Vaara et al, 2005). In this sense, the firm-specific 
advantages of MNCs are counterbalanced by the location-specific advantages of players 
anchored within local networks who may otherwise be misrecognized as relatively low power 
actors. As Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008) stress, such views may be erroneous, especially 
when (semi)autonomous actors inhabiting their own socio-political contexts and endowed 
with vital resources pertaining to the locality can exercise power and influence in their own 
right.  
From the work of Bourdieu (1993; 1996), we deduce that the political contests that 
determine the outcomes of inter-organizational change projects are played out in the field of 
power, the integrative social arena that brings together dominant actors from varying 
backgrounds. The ability to access prized resources is associated with network centrality and 
 
 
active agency (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008; Geppert et al., 2016; Harvey and Maclean, 
2008). Despite the emphasis placed upon relationship asymmetry (e.g. Inkpen and Beamish, 
1997), local actors may be able to leverage critical resources strategically, including through 
their status and positioning in the topography of social relations which comprise local fields 
of power, providing access to valuable relationships and resources and alerting them to local 
opportunities (Anheier et al., 1995; Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2009; Suddaby et al., 2016). 
It is this situatedness within the host country’s unique institutional configuration that 
determines the scope and strength of their bargaining power, suggesting that highly 
networked actors in the host country are likely to be relatively empowered and in demand 
(Ferner et al., 2005).  
The varieties of capitalism and comparative institutionalism literatures elaborate the 
manifold ways in which different countries and localities are subject to varying governance 
regimes, rationalities and jurisdictions (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Maclean et al., 2006; Morgan 
and Kristensen, 2006; Whitley, 1999). Individual governments can have notable impact on 
the competitive environments within which MNCs compete (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). 
Elected and appointed government officials are important players in fashioning business 
activity in contextualized domains ‘internally shot through… with social, socio-political, 
sociocultural and socioeconomic specificity’ (Harzing and Sorge, 2003: 207).  
Here we reason that the establishment of foreign-based subsidiaries must take account 
not of a unitary field of power as commonly depicted but rather of individualized, variegated 
fields of power, subject to local cultural and political logics, and populated by indigenous 
elites and dignitaries. A macro-level perspective on MNCs is insufficient on its own to 
understand the differentiated contexts within which political struggles play out. To appreciate 
the extent of institutional diversity experienced in MNCs demands a fine-grained analysis 
that complements a broader macro-regional perspective by taking account of local micro-
 
 
political specificities and idiosyncrasies (Morgan, 2011). This shifts the emphasis from power 
asymmetry to contextually situated interaction (Becker-Ritterspach and Dörrenbächer, 2011, 
Geppert et al., 2003b); influence being ‘primarily the result of who interacts with whom’ 
(Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008: 487). As Fligstein (2001: 108) writes:  
 
‘Institution building moments occur when groups of social actors confront one 
another in some set of social interactions that is contentious. These moments are 
inherently political and concern struggles over scarce resources by groups with 
differing amount of power’.  
 
This underscores the role of interrelationships, dynamic, evolving and innately political, on 
the part of skilled social actors who engage in meaning making, networking and coalition 
building within local fields of power, seeking to build trust and reputation with gatekeepers 
and resource-holders and resolve ambiguities (Morgan and Kristensen, 2006; Rindova et al., 
2006). It is within and between these strategic action fields that political contests shaping 
organizational fields are played out (Fligstein, 2001). 
 
Ideological discourse in international business 
The power to shape social reality is primarily textual, power being ‘a matter of the 
successful deployment of meaning’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Brown, 1998: 49). Hence 
power and discourse are closely related to ideology (Clegg et al., 2006). Ideology refers to the 
science of ideas; and, when formulated in discourse, ideas have a potent political force 
(Eagleton, 2013). Organizational fields are not preordained but emerge from processes of 
discursive construction, meaning making and sensemaking (Geppert and Dörrenbächer, 2016; 
Hardy and Phillips), often ideological in orientation (Maclean et al., 2014; Simons and 
 
 
Ingram, 1997). In international business, these processes are led by institutional entrepreneurs 
who engage in persuasive communication aimed at target constituencies at home and abroad 
to claim legitimacy for their political projects (Erkama and Vaara, 2010; Lawrence and 
Phillips, 2004; Suchman, 1995). Rhetoric has a strong legitimating capacity (Suddaby and 
Greenwood, 2005), through which actors seek to enhance their credibility and reputation 
(Rindova et al., 2007). Legitimacy claiming is likely to entail contestation, which requires 
discursive skills to succeed (Vaara et al., 2005). Drawing on Eagleton (2013) and Fligstein 
(2001), we define ‘ideology’ as a set of values and principles informed by a given worldview 
whose discursive promotion by skilled social actors underpins and legitimises their activity in 
strategic action fields. 
In constructing meaning for stakeholders, skilled social actors simultaneously create 
meaning for themselves (Fligstein, 2001). Such discursive activity is fundamentally political 
because it provides a means for actors to frame accounts intended to garner approval from 
relevant constituencies by chiming with their concerns and identities. This type of political 
sensemaking enables actors to (re)fashion dominant ideologies to suit their own interests, 
which in turn influences allocative outcomes by determining access to markets and resources 
(Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). Political sensemaking and sensegiving propel discursive 
enactment through the generation and acceptance of a ‘shared interpretive frame’ (Brown, 
1994: 873; Hong et al., 2016; Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991). Rhetoric is a powerful vehicle for 
crafting political meaning because it represents the primary means of communication that 
orders social agency (Sillince and Suddaby, 2008). The political messages it produces can be 
used to mobilize opinion against opponents (Fligstein, 2001). Hence, the use of language that 
is inherently persuasive may be seen to have ‘productive effects’ which are also effects of 
power by enabling skilled actors to engender a preferred version of the ‘truth’ (Clegg et al., 
 
 
2006; Golant et al., 2015; Riad, 2005: 1548). Communication is therefore not ‘a passive 
vessel or conduit for logics’ but galvanizes action (Suddaby, 2011: 185). 
The use of rhetoric by powerholders may also enable target audiences to cope better 
with ambiguity. As Blazejewski and Becker-Ritterspach (2016) argue, in ambivalent 
situations those actors who can reduce insecurity may find their power enhanced. Politicized 
discourse by leading actors can lessen institutional distance, and hence tensions, between 
home and host communities. Shaping collective cognitions in this way can allow actors to 
connect with hearts and minds (Eagleton, 2013). By drawing on discursive resources through 
speech making, for example, powerholders may generate positive emotional responses, 
encouraging stakeholder audiences in home and host countries to buy into their political 
messages while enhancing their social influence and perceived standing (Rindova et al., 
2007). Emphasizing collective interests is legitimating because it affords a type of ‘political 
cover’ (Hillman, 1999: 472). In this regard, legitimacy may be considered a primary means of 
regulating power distributions across the wide-ranging geographies in which MNCs operate 
(Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008); the most effective legitimacy strategies being multilevel, 
embracing both macro- and micro-levels (Bitektine and Haack, 2015). 
 
Methods 
Analysis of archival and oral history data can cast fresh light on everyday realities 
within MNCs as well as the political processes pertinent to their founding and life-course. We 
determined to locate archival data on a first-mover MNC instrumental in laying the 
foundations of a global industry in the aftermath of World War II. We were attracted to HI by 
the pre-existing research interests of one research team member familiar with its longstanding 
hegemonic position within the hotel business. While Intercontinental Hotels was the first 
mover as a hotel MNC (Quek, 2012), it was HI that led the way; its adoption and 
 
 
dissemination of numerous business innovations shaping policies and practices within the 
hospitality industry we know today. Our case selection was vindicated on gaining access to 
Conrad Hilton’s substantial personal and business records.  
 The Hilton papers housed at the Hotel Industry Archive (HIA) at the University of 
Houston are extensive, representing printed series of president’s letters, annual reports and 
accounts, photographs and other assorted items, an oral history series, and 345 boxes of 
business and personal papers comprising around 4,500 folders, the majority of which contain 
multiple documents.1 The archive remains to be fully catalogued. Wide-ranging searches are 
required to assemble documents relevant to specific themes. Our own search strategy, 
implemented in the course of two lengthy visits by three researchers, focused on collecting 
data relating to the development of HHC and its subsidiaries from its inception in 1946 to the 
founder’s standing down from executive responsibilities in 1969.  
Following our return from Houston, we categorized all material assembled based on 
its purpose and topic. We decided to investigate the construction of the global hotel industry 
through a political and discursive lens. Our interest was aroused by the boldness with which 
Hilton sought to expand the boundaries of the organization into unchartered waters and 
politically ‘contested terrain’ (Edwards and Bélanger, 2009; Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). As 
we reviewed the material, it became clear that a corollary of each launch was ideological 
sensemaking, locating the geopolitical significance of each hotel in a world Hilton deemed 
imperilled by communism. Bound up with political sensemaking was an explicit impetus to 
action, designed to spur uncommitted actors across politically disparate nations to subscribe 
to free enterprise solutions as a means of raising living standards (Djelic, 1998). It is 
important to state as a caveat that as may happen with business archives, there is a danger that 
material casting the company in an unfavourable light may not have been retained, potentially 
leading to systematic bias in historical interpretation, which might be compounded further by 
 
 
author bias in data selection (Anteby and Molnár, 2012). We endeavoured to combat the 
latter by comprehensive data extraction, and believe the former unlikely because of retention 
of so much personally sensitive material in the archive. 
From our material, we constructed three datasets, each deriving from multiple 
documents, as a foundation for further analysis. First, by obtaining data from HHC and HI 
annual reports, we were able to study closely the domestic and international development and 
expansion of the Hilton businesses. Second, we decided to undertake an in-depth examination 
of Hilton hotel projects globally, according particular attention to countries in which political 
tensions were rife. This enabled us to extract data pertaining inter alia to protagonists from 
home and host localities, the political activities in which they engaged, their access to 
resources, and activities in fields of power. Third, we independently analysed, categorized 
and coded some 62 public speeches delivered by Conrad Hilton from 1950 to 1965. Our 
analysis entailed specifying the primary target audience of each speech, identifying its main 
arguments, and calculating the word count devoted to each. Differences in coding were 
debated and resolved. We did not ascribe names to different speeches, since this had already 
been done, with titles such as ‘The Battle for Freedom’ or ‘People do not choose 
Communism’ assigned. Ideology featured prominently as a theme across the range of 
speeches consulted. The following extract from ‘We are the Early Americans’ delivered by 
Hilton in 1953 is typical:  
 
‘If communism is a system of revolutionary ideas we must match it with another 
system of ideas. That we are doing. In fact, our system begins where theirs ends. The 
communist revolutionary says he wants enough world power to set all men free; the 
American revolutionary sets men free to build their own power.’ (HIA, 1953a: 6) 
 
 
 
These three analyses enabled us to identify recurring thematic ideas across the body 
of material consulted, and to differentiate between genres of politicized activity undertaken at 
HI. As we became more absorbed in our data, additional readings and deliberation led to our 
discerning four key political processes practiced at HI, on the basis of which we coded our 
data (Berg, 2009). These processes are: rhetorically intense argumentation, elite political 
networking, coalition building and cultivating officialdom, as summarized in Table 1. This 
table synthesizes our thematic interrogation of a large volume of documentary and oral 
history evidence relating to the emergence of HI as a global force, which we reflect upon 
below. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Political ideology and discursive construction at Hilton International 
There is considerable variation within and between industries in the business models 
and practices of MNCs (Geppert et al., 2003a). In the hotel industry, the business model first 
propagated by HI and its rival Intercontinental Hotels remains the global industry standard 
(Dunning and McQueen, 1981; Quek, 2012). It is characterized by having multiple 
independently owned hotels managed under various types of contract by brand-owning 
MNCs, separating hotel ownership from management. This was a novel departure from the 
own-and-operate model pursued by HHC in the US (HIA, 1958a). For HI the advantage lay 
in minimizing risks and capital requirements. For owners it promised higher returns through 
prestigious branding, network access and the application of superior operational and 
marketing skills. Owners provided the capital needed to develop and build hotels to HI 
specifications, working closely with US and local architects and designers to retain the 
symbols of national cultural identity (Vaara et al., 2005). HI organized training for host-
country staff and arranged well publicized launch events, financed by owners and attended by 
 
 
American celebrities and local elites. Having met pre-opening costs, owners leased their 
properties to HI, typically for 20 years, and as rent received two-thirds of operating profits, 
HI retaining the remaining one-third. HI accepted limited risk in providing working capital by 
securing loans from host-country banks. The leasehold contract predominated in the early 
years, but in time, under pressure from owners seeking a better deal, it ceded to a new form 
of management contract (DeRoos, 2010). Under this, owning companies recompensed Hilton 
by some combination of a smaller share of operating profits, say 10%, plus a fixed percentage 
of turnover, for example 10% of room revenues and 5% of food, beverage and other 
revenues. 
 
Political processes at HI 
The contemporary world economic order regulated by international rules and 
managed by international organizations is the product of a long process of institution building 
that began in earnest following World War II (North, 1990). National governments 
progressively have yielded sovereignty in favour of international rules governing trade, 
capital flows, property rights and business conduct (Kaplinsky, 2004). Widespread agreement 
that multilateralism reduces transaction costs and stimulates economic growth has been 
fundamental to globalization and the emergence of global corporations. 
 It is mistaken, however, to assume that the relative ease with which MNCs operate 
nowadays in multiple national jurisdictions is the preordained outcome of anonymous 
economic forces. The political consensus that exists emerged fitfully, differentially, through a 
socially constructed process of argumentation and alliance building in a world of competing 
ideologies and political turbulence (Behrman, 1971). When Conrad Hilton set course in the 
late 1940s to build a chain of hotels in major global cities, little could be taken for granted. 
There were few norms or expectations. The argument for multilateralism and international 
 
 
economic integration had yet to be fully articulated, let alone won. The evident need in 
country after country where he sought to establish a hotel was to find common ground, 
emphasize collective interests, adapt to the local environment, and overcome barriers to 
market entry (Hillman, 1999). In this endeavour, rhetorically intense argumentation, elite 
political networking, coalition building and cultivating officialdom were complementary 
processes bound together by a unifying vision of HI as facilitator of world peace through 
international trade and travel. Hilton outlined this vision as follows:  
 
The time is not too distant when a traveller, circling the globe, will be able to stop at a 
Hilton hotel in almost any world city he may visit…. These hotels express our ideal 
that any hotel anywhere should be more than just the center of the community. From 
an international aspect, the hotel can become the focal point for the exchange of 
knowledge between millions of people, citizens and visitors alike, who have gathered 
there because they desire to know each other better, trade with each other and live 
with each other in peace (HIA, 1955: 4). 
 
Hilton was an accomplished speechmaker who recognized the power of discourse in 
helping shape the thoughts and actions of influential actors on whom realization of his global 
vision depended. From the 62 speeches we analysed, we used the first-order arguments we 
discerned to distinguish twelve second-order themes, which map in turn to the four aggregate 
political processes identified above, as can be seen from Table 2 (Corley and Gioia, 2004). 
Rhetorically intense argumentation went beyond the anti-communist platitudes of the day to 
identify ideologically uncommitted nations at risk of becoming communist as the prime target 
for US intervention. Elite political networking was facilitated by persuading political, 
business and government elites at home and overseas that international hotels were an 
 
 
important weapon in the fight against communism, which Hilton saw as an ideological rather 
than a military struggle. In building the coalitions needed to deliver hotel projects, Hilton 
used his speeches to forge ideological, economic and political bonds of affiliation between 
host countries and the US government and business. These ideals were reinforced by spelling 
out to host officials, assiduously cultivated through sustained interaction by his managers, the 
practical advantages of investing in hotels for national economic development. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
Rhetorically intense argumentation 
When interviewed in 1993, Curt Strand, former President of HI, characterized Conrad 
Hilton as primarily ‘a deal maker, an entrepreneur, a showman’ (HIA, 1993:10). Strand 
observed Hilton closely for over two decades and considered him ‘a genius in knowing what 
would be good in the future’ with a genuine ‘sense of the dramatic, very much at home in 
show business … doing exciting things’ (HIA, 1993: 9). HI ‘was really his baby’, born of his 
imagining how modern American hotels might help the ‘free world’ vanquish communism 
(HIA, 1992: 3). Hilton, Strand maintained, was a man of political vision whose personal 
contribution to HI’s success was to attune its political strategy to the global forces driving 
economic and social change. Strand commented that by means of political nous, Hilton 
regularly ‘dominated the room, and then he dominated the deal’ (HIA, 1993: 9). On this 
reading, supported by a wealth of evidence, Hilton had the political and rhetorical skills 
required not only to respond to events but to shape outcomes to the benefit of HI. The pursuit 
of power is linked to sensemaking and sensegiving, and Hilton may be seen in this regard to 
position his ideologically inspired, rhetorically intense argumentation within transnational 
political discourses with which they were designed to resonate (Riad, 2005). 
 
 
 A mainstream Republican, who had served for a year as a representative in the New 
Mexico Legislature, Hilton believed in free enterprise, property rights, democracy, low taxes, 
and non-intrusive government. He pragmatically courted influential politicians of all hues, 
including Richard Nixon, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson (HIA, 1960a; HIA, 1962a; 
HIA, 1962b). He was a close friend of President Dwight Eisenhower (1953-1961) and ally in 
the fight against communism (Hilton, 1957: 275-6). Rhetoric provides an effective vehicle for 
legitimacy claiming, in this case setting a value-infused path designed to appeal to target 
constituencies in a period of political uncertainty (Suchman, 1995; Suddaby and Greenwood, 
2005). In a series of 62 rhetorically intense political speeches delivered during the 1950s and 
early 1960s, he constructed a coherent, rationalizing argument that denounced communism as 
‘the death of the individual and the burial of his remains in a collective mass grave’ and the 
Soviet Union as ‘a great spider – the evil men of the Kremlin feeling around the perimeter of 
their vast empire, probing incessantly for military or political soft spots to enmesh the world 
in their web of tyranny’ (HIA, 1950: 4). The US government was therefore correct, he 
claimed, to take the lead in resisting the threat posed by communism to the free world by 
economic and military means, particularly in Europe where the battle was ‘to win the peace’ 
(HIA, 1952a: 3). The solution he proposed, widely reported in the media, was for private 
enterprise to join the US government in delivering the capital, expertise and organizational 
skills needed to bring prosperity to war-fatigued nations, eliminating the communist threat by 
demonstrating the superiority of free enterprise in generating growth and rising living 
standards (HIA, 1956a: 9). 
Strategically, Hilton followed General Marshall, architect of the European Recovery 
Programme (ERP, commonly known as Marshall Aid), and Presidents Truman and 
Eisenhower in opposing the installation of new communist regimes in Europe, Latin America 
and Asia (Merrill, 2006; Stanford, 1982). He became nationally prominent as one of the small 
 
 
minority of business leaders actively to support US interventionism and the ERP (Djelic, 
1998). As a rhetorically intense speechmaker, he added two personal elements to the anti-
communist argument. First, he dissociated ‘the battle for freedom’ from the ideal of 
democracy. Communism, he believed, was evil at core because it was ‘faithless’, and as such 
was oppressive to the human spirit. It was wise therefore, he reasoned, to recognize that any 
political system that defended faith communities was preferable to communism, which 
should be vigorously opposed by all religions (HIA, 1956a: 11-14). His own faith was 
Catholicism, and in General Franco, for example, he did not see a dictator to be sanctioned 
but a hero who delivered Spain from communism (HIA, 1953b: 3-4). Second, he positioned 
the international hotel industry as pivotal to any political strategy designed to divert countries 
from communism toward capitalism and identification with US interests. What was at stake 
was not simply ensuring that traditional allies remained true to capitalism, but also that the 
‘uncommitted third’ of non-aligned countries, torn between socialism and capitalism, should 
ultimately side with capitalism (HIA, 1957). International hotels that embraced American 
tastes, technologies and values were crucial to this venture because they represented safe 
havens where locals might interact with business people, politicians and travellers from the 
US and allied countries. They thus had both practical value and politically symbolic 
significance in expressing hope for a brighter economic future (HIA, 1956a). 
 The ideologically-imbued speeches given by Hilton at hotel openings were 
particularly important in communicating these messages. Launch events were symbolic 
events that often extended over three days (Brown, 1994); uniting national political, 
administrative and business elites with US cultural icons and officials flown in from the US 
(HIA, 1959a). The presence of stars of stage and screen added to the lustre of the openings 
and ensured they were reported in the local media (Rindova et al., 2007). The HI publicity 
department routinely supplied newspapers and magazines with Hilton’s speech, a 15 page 
 
 
corporate biography, a guest list, photographs, and interesting facts about the design and 
specifications of the new hotel (HIA, 1959b). These materials formed the basis of countless 
press reports and features, underlining that HI had a mission: to bring people together in 
pursuit of mutual understanding, peace and prosperity. Each speech, as Table 3 attests, was 
carefully attuned to the local, micro-level political context while chiming with transnational, 
macro-level political issues. Each sought to lessen institutional distance between home and 
host actors by emphasizing the broader ideological ‘battleground’ in which both were 
presumed to be engaged, suppressing national differences to emphasize macro-political 
commonalities (Contu and Willmott, 2003). After welcoming guests, there typically followed 
a long eulogistic section demonstrating knowledge and respect for the history and culture of 
the host nation before delivering incisively a macro-level, yet contextually sensitive political 
message. Ideology entails a ‘call to action… in a world-referencing discourse’ (Gouldner, 
2013: 208-9). As self-appointed statesman, Hilton urged elite guests and everyday readers to 
consider the political choices facing them, inviting them to join the US in fashioning a new, 
economically integrated community of free world nations. In this, business and ideological 
considerations went hand-in-hand. He succeeded at the same time in amplifying the HI brand, 
identifying it with modernity, internationalism, and religious tolerance, and enhancing its 
visibility and reputational benefit (Rindova et al., 2007). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
Elite political networking 
Contemporary celebrity is a by-product of processes of mass communication 
(Gamson, 1994; Rindova et al., 2006). Hilton’s speeches and attendant publicity spearheaded 
his emergence as celebrity and public figure during the 1950s, easing access to influential 
 
 
political figures in the US and globally. His mind-set in courting top politicians was not 
narrowly instrumental. Rather, he knew that befriending Eisenhower, Nixon and Earl Warren, 
Chief Justice of the US, or meeting with Heads of State like Franco (Spain), Nasser (Egypt) 
and Tito (Yugoslavia) or being photographed with esteemed figures like the British monarch, 
Elizabeth II, and Pope Paul VI by symbolic association raised his personal stock and the 
value of the Hilton brand (Guthey et al., 2009; Holt, 2004). Those at the apex of society 
might extend goodwill by endorsing him, his company or a particular project, and others 
lower down the social hierarchy might assume he warranted support because of the authority 
conferred by high-level connections. These he cultivated assiduously through pledges of 
allegiance, personal gift giving, and hosting elite gatherings. Party political affiliation 
mattered little. Before Democrat John F. Kennedy succeeded Eisenhower as President in 
1961, for example, Hilton wrote to Kennedy’s father confirming that although ‘from a strong 
Republican family’ he was ‘impressed … and completely happy that [his son John] was 
going to make good’ (HIA, 1960b). Likewise, when in 1963 he gifted copies of his book 
Inspirations of an Innkeeper to his ‘friends’, power trumped all else in the choice of 
recipients (HIA, 1967). The same rule applied when hosting elite events like the annual 
Presidential Prayer Breakfast, inaugurated in 1953, at which he sought to build consensus 
around shared faith-based values (HIA, 1954a). 
 The non-judgemental, inclusive approach to governing elites outside the communist 
bloc became fundamental to the credo of HI, handed down from founder to senior managers 
throughout the organization. HI’s enhanced visibility as it expanded across the globe 
accentuated ‘the need to be perceived as cooperating with like interests rather than acting 
individually’ (Hillman, 1999: 472). Paradoxically, therefore, while HI was an instrument of 
anti-communism, in all other matters its political stance was neutral. The imperative was to 
engage in elite political networking with core actors in their respective environments in order 
 
 
to build hotels and reach institutional settlements that benefited all parties – on the basis that, 
united against communism, they had much more in common than divided them. Engaging in 
local fields of power even-handedly addressed issues of institutional duality by reducing the 
apparent distance between home and host groups (Morgan and Kristensen, 2006). In Berlin, 
for example, Curt Strand was ‘greeted like a visiting statesman from the Western world’ 
receiving invitations to socialize ‘from all the city’s leaders and … military commanders’ 
(HIA, 1993: 2). Legislation was needed in the Berlin Senate to approve the hotel and 
establish the ground rules for its operation. Funding arrangements had to be agreed requiring 
sanction from the US ERP authorities and national political leaders, including Willy Brandt, 
Governing Mayor of Berlin and future Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (HIA, 
1964a). Here, as elsewhere, success depended upon collaboration and sensitivity to micro- as 
well as macro-politics (Morgan, 2011; Ferner et al., 2012). As Strand explained, Berlin was 
‘a political problem more than an economic problem … a military situation, it was a hotbed 
of intrigue’ (HIA, 1993: 6). In the 1950s, in countries wracked by war, political complexity 
was commonplace. When, in 1961, HI entered an agreement to operate in Tel Aviv, Israel, 
for example, several Arab governments threatened to terminate operating contracts in their 
own countries. The argument in defence, eventually accepted by all, was premised on 
political neutrality. In a personal letter signed by Hilton, it was stated that HI did not favour 
any country, but without prejudice offered ‘a management service to the benefit of the 
country concerned’, taking ‘no part in politics’, its interests confined to travel and tourism 
(HIA, 1992: 17). 
 The combination of anti-communism with context-sensitive elite political networking 
worked to the competitive advantage of HI. First, it invested the enterprise with a magnetic 
quality such that it was inundated with joint venture propositions from around the world. The 
route to profitable growth lay in selecting the best on offer and avoiding costly mistakes 
 
 
(HIA, 1961). Second, as partner of choice in most cases, as in Iran where the Shah gifted a 
prime site and invested directly in the hotel, or Berlin and Istanbul where the US government 
provided ERP funding, HI was able to negotiate advantageous terms and conditions (HIA, 
1959c). Third, the leverage secured through possession of abundant political capital 
legitimized HI activities and paved the way for success in country after country. The US 
ambassadorial service and other agencies of state frequently lent support when the going got 
tough, as in Athens and Rome (HIA, 1951; HIA, 1954b). Likewise, within the host country 
field of power, when obstacles had to be overcome, such as securing planning permission or 
relaxing currency controls, the intervention of well-connected local politicians often afforded 
the legitimizing ‘political cover’ indispensable to move projects forwards (Hillman, 1999). 
 
Coalition building 
Realization of Hilton’s vision of a chain of Hilton branded hotels across the world, 
without significant foreign direct investment (FDI), depended crucially on locating prime 
sites in major cities and access to host-country capital. This involved coalition building with 
other ‘field dominants’, home country elites who discerned financial advantage in working 
with HI to pursue shared objectives and jointly advantageous futures (McAdam and Scott, 
2005: 17). The basic proposition was that by leveraging the HI brand and operational 
expertise a new hotel within an international network could yield a far higher rate of return 
than if managed domestically. The premium earned could be divided to mutual advantage 
between owner and HI. Many ventures were initiated by HI, but others were initiated directly 
by host-country nationals, as in Puerto Rico, Madrid, Havana and Tehran (HIA, 1960c). It 
was critical to the success of HI that it had the expertise needed to select and work closely 
with in-country partners. For ten years this was the job of executive vice-president John 
Houser, whose reports provide a graphic account of what was involved (HIA, 1958b). 
 
 
 The process was not narrowly calculative. The costs of constructing, equipping and 
launching a new hotel were detailed and return on capital estimated. This information, 
however, was not crucial in partner selection: subjective judgements gleaned from relational 
interaction mattered more. Of particular importance were reputational and social capital 
(Kostova and Roth, 2003; Kotha et al., 2001). Houser gathered intelligence from local 
lawyers, bankers, officials, politicians and businessmen to assess whether individuals and 
organization had the capacities needed to deliver a major capital project when confronted 
with opposing forces (HIA, 1951; HIA, 1954b). Only those of high standing and dense social 
networks made the grade (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990). In Mexico, for example, the moving 
spirit behind the Continental Hilton in Mexico City was business tycoon Manuel Suárez, 
highly placed within the country’s political-economic ruling elite (HIA, 1952b). Similarly, in 
Greece, the Athens Hilton project was entrusted to the politically influential banker, Stratis 
Andreadis (HIA, 1963c). Once a contract was signed between HI and future owner, Houser 
reported on routine business issues and less tractable political and bureaucratic problems. 
Often, as in Rome, London and Paris, where host-country powerholders dragged their feet in 
protracted non-decision-making, it took years to overcome entrenched political and 
regulatory issues (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963). HI could count on support from US 
diplomats, but in numerous cases lobbying and political interventions fell to host-country 
partners. It is unsurprising therefore that HI was keen to develop hotels with government 
agencies and non-profits with ready access to decision makers, as in Istanbul (government 
pension fund), Havana (catering union), Tehran (Pahlavi Foundation) and Berlin (municipal 
government) (HIA, 1960). In these cases, political opposition and bureaucratic resistance 
were more easily overcome and projects delivered relatively quickly. As Table 4 confirms, 
the degree of resistance encountered was typically higher in Europe, the Middle East and 
Africa (EMEA), leading to much longer project development times. 
 
 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
Cultivating officialdom 
The problems encountered by HI in getting projects off the ground in EMEA were 
severe in the 1950s due to nationally variant combinations of economic privation, political 
instability and resistance to US corporate encroachment in domestic economies. National 
governments faced severe resourcing constraints, and especially the US dollars needed for 
vital imports (Findlay and O’Rourke, 2007). The ERP eased the situation in beneficiary 
countries, but currency controls, import licensing and other centrally imposed restrictions 
remained the norm down to the 1960s. Hotel building was not a priority, and in only two 
countries – Turkey and Germany – was HI successful in securing ERP funds to finance its 
projects. These countries were in the front line in the fight against communism, and building 
a Hilton hotel gave symbolic expression to the Truman doctrine of US resistance against 
Soviet territorial encroachment (Wharton, 2001). Elsewhere, where there were higher 
priorities, as in Britain, France and Italy, there was evidence of recipient reluctance (Clark 
and Geppert, 2006). Here, political opponents and government officials conspired to create 
delays in planning approvals, operating agreements, and licenses (Bachrach and Baratz, 
1963). In Italy and France, there was deep-seated resistance to collaborating with US firms in 
new hotel construction. In such cases systematically cultivating officialdom was vital to 
circumvent obstructionism (Stern and Westphal, 2010). 
 The HI business model was beneficial in negating the worst effects of economic 
nationalism since ‘rather than assume the role of invaders intent on siphoning off all the 
profits to the United States, Hilton join[ed] forces in business fellowship with foreign 
entrepreneurs’ (HIA, 1956b: 14). Its ‘unique philosophy’ was to hasten the interpenetration of 
 
 
capitalist elites to create a bulwark against communism and the social and political capital 
needed to realize its corporate vision. This meant forming alliances with entrepreneurs and 
industrialists who had ready access to government officials responsible for making and 
enforcing institutional settlements (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). In Rome, for example, the 
principal ally was Aldo Samaritani, Director General of the Società Generale Immobialare, 
the leading Italian property company. As early as July 1951, Houser reported to Hilton he had 
visited government officials with Samaritani, transported plans by truck and put on displays. 
There had been meetings with cabinet ministers, and they were ‘targeting’ Prime Minister 
Alcide De Gasperi. US officials responsible for administering the ERP were reputedly 
coming to future meetings ‘to bump their heads if there is any more sissy stuff,’ as Houser 
bluntly put it (HIA, 1951). Yet, as in many other countries, negotiations dragged on for years, 
delaying the opening of the Rome Hilton until June 1963. 
 How profit is distributed is pivotal to the smooth running of cross-border business 
(Morgan, 2011). A major stumbling block in EMEA in the 1950s was HI’s insistence that 
profits might freely be remitted to the US in dollars, which often required a special decree to 
be issued by the financial authorities, as in Spain (HIA, 1956c); or an innovative solution 
found, as in Egypt, where the Minister of Finance agreed that HI could ‘withhold at source’ 
by depositing in New York dollar payments made by customers using American Express or 
similar means of payment (HIA, 1992: 16). In time, as financial pressure eased and the 
international economy expanded, dollar convertibility became a lesser problem. As tourism 
and business travel boomed, dollars flowed and international hotel building moved sharply up 
the priority order of governments. There was a powerful demonstration effect as early movers 
in the tourism industry, like Spain and Puerto Rico, reaped the benefits. Other countries 
began to compete, and by the early 1960s sweeteners such as  ‘tax exemptions, guaranteed 
return to investors, donation of site, waiver of import duties, guaranteed dollar conversion 
 
 
and other incentives’ became commonplace (HIA, 1964b: 6). International norming brought 
institutional convergence, making negotiations simpler, cutting the time needed to bring 
projects to fruition. It was at this point that HI, as a chief first mover with a powerful brand, 
really began to reap the benefits of earlier political endeavours. 
 
Discussion 
At the outset of this paper, we posed two research questions pertaining to the political 
processes in which core actors engaged in the discursive construction of the global hotel 
industry, and to the adaptation of meaning within the varying political settings within which 
HI operated. The business model initiated by HI was innovative and novel. Hence, in 
answering the first question, it is important to stress that we are not dealing with a single 
process. The construction of a global industry necessarily involved multiple processes. We 
propose that the astute adoption by skilled social actors of rhetorically intense 
argumentation, elite political networking, coalition building and cultivating officialdom 
enabled them to interact to good effect in selected localities while demonstrating that they 
had the interests of indigenous elites, governments and communities at heart. According due 
recognition to local actors empowered the former while casting HI in an altruistic light, 
affording political cover and legitimacy (Fligstein, 1997; Hillman, 1999; Maclean and 
Harvey, 2016). In history, emphasis is often laid on the role of charismatic individuals, to the 
detriment of the teams of individuals they had at their disposal who are often overlooked. 
Hilton may have ‘dominated the room, and then… the deal’ (HIA, 1993: 9), as Strand put it. 
Yet it is important to recognize the influence of social interaction within strategic action 
fields, and hence the vital role played by core teams of home- and host-country actors whose 
manifold contributions were vital to founding the global hotel industry as it emerged and 
exists today. Hilton could not have achieved this alone. He was in this sense primus inter 
 
 
pares, joined in the task by numerous field dominants at home and abroad, underlining 
Fligstein’s (2001: 111, our emphasis) point that: 
 
‘actors (decision makers, managers, leaders, or elites) have many constituencies to 
balance off and they must continuously be aware that they have to produce 
arrangements that induce cooperation with both their allies and opponents… Rational 
actor models… miss the creativity and skill of individuals, as representatives of 
collectivities, to operate vis-à-vis other actors to produce, reproduce, and transform 
institutional arrangements’. 
 
In addressing the second question, we suggest that the local was recognized at HI as a 
vital, and specific, domain. Ideology is often experienced as universalising, presenting 
‘partisan, controversial, historically specific values as true of all times and all places’ 
(Eagleton, 2013: 9). The broad ideological sweep of the rhetoric employed at differing hotel 
openings, emphasizing common point and purpose at the macro level, was therefore nuanced 
to suit the specific micro-level institutional contexts in which hotels were situated; using 
different accounts as vocabularies of motive in different situations while expressing due 
respect for the political context and cultural heritage of the host community. Thus, while the 
discourse was modulated to encompass political diversity and institutional pluralism, the 
basic ideological template remained constant. It resonated with a broader macro-political 
discourse informed by a pronounced anti-communist critique, highlighting perceived 
common ground between different political rationalities which, in the case of the 
‘uncommitted third’, it sought to augment. In this way ‘microlevel communication and action 
[were designed to] yield macrolevel outcomes’ (Bitektine and Haack, 2015: 69).  
 
 
Our study adds to the literature on the role of power and political discourse in MNCs 
(Clegg et al., 2006; Geppert and Dörrenbächer, 2016; Geppert et al., 2016; Hardy and 
Phillips, 1998; Levy, 2008; Morgan and Kristensen, 2006) and particularly to the literature on 
political strategizing by MNCs by exploring the role of ideology in shaping an organizational 
field (Fligstein, 2001; Hillman, 2003; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Hillman et al., 2004; Maclean 
et al., 2014; Simons and Ingram, 1997). Our case analysis shows how the boundary shaping 
of an MNC ‘depends on the discursive justification used to rationalize it’ (Green, 2004: 653). 
Organizational fields are not predetermined but emerge from the intentional deployment of 
meaning by principal actors. We shed light on the nature of MNCs as combinations of micro-
political systems located in interactive fields of power, where power is distributed across 
home and host actors engaged in skilful political manoeuvring to increase their stock and 
further their interests. We contribute to this literature by revealing how, through astute 
political sensemaking and sensegiving, macro-political discourse which is ideological and 
hence likely to be experienced as universalising may be allied to micro-political practices in 
the transnational social space, in this way addressing the unique situatedness of each locality 
in question (Bitektine and Haack, 2015; Morgan, 2011).  
In this regard, our main contribution to the literature on the role of politics and 
discourse in MNCs is to demonstrate how the very foundation of a global industry may be 
politically and ideologically inspired. Our research reveals that overseas expansion can have 
a dual motivation, business and ideological, with Hilton acting as statesman on behalf of the 
US with the backing of government. This is an important and hitherto unexplored aspect of 
the literature, providing an overtly ideological context for FDI. Fligstein (1997; 2001) 
emphasizes the importance of ‘social skill’ in fields in general. Our contribution to theory 
here is much more specific acknowledgement of the importance of political ideology as a 
particular ‘social skill’. The growth of the global hotel industry was bound up with Hilton’s 
 
 
vision of expanding the boundaries of the pro-Western ‘free world’, achievable through 
discursive dissemination and enactment (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). Ideology connects 
belief with action (Simons and Ingram, 1997). The extraordinary development of HI often in 
politically contested terrain, where constituency building might seem initially unpromising, 
attests to the agential power of ideological sensemaking that reaches beyond objectives of 
persuasion and co-option to ‘create entire new systems of meaning’ by promoting a new 
order (Fligstein, 2001: 106; Morgan and Kristensen, 2006). Thus, a global hotel industry 
imbued with the aim of fostering world peace by bringing together dignitaries, business 
travellers and tourists may be seen to be discursively constructed and ‘talked into existence’ 
(Weick, 2009: 4).  
What detailed scrutiny of this discursive political activity demonstrates, above all, is 
the degree to which transnational institution-building and the global industrial order, far from 
emerging spontaneously, have been shaped by communication and contests (Behrman, 1981; 
Clark and Geppert, 2006). Politics, Clegg (2017) asserts, is the very business of MNCs, and 
ideas the primary form of weaponry (Eagleton, 2013). Political struggles are part-and-parcel 
of the global diffusion of rationalized management templates by principal social actors, 
which have helped to determine how international business has been ‘won’. The thrust of our 
argument is that one cannot fully understand the contemporary scene and rules of the game as 
currently operating without reference to the formative historical period in the quarter century 
after WWII (Maclean, Harvey and Clegg, 2016). Our analysis shifts the emphasis away from 
the overly reductive notion that contemporary global capitalism emerged from the 
endeavours of American corporate leaders bent on exporting the American model (Djelic, 
1998). What we reveal here is rather the development of a new model responsive to local 
circumstances. In doing so, we advocate a bigger picture according to which the institutional 
convergence vital to the full flowering of MNCs like HI was necessarily wider than exporting 
 
 
a pre-existing model, involving multiple actors across varying geographies whose 
contributions are often unsung. While led by the US, and in HI’s case by a talented, 
charismatic leader, he enlisted and inspired elite actors within home and host nations. Initially 
slow and politically fractious, the combined effect of rhetorically intense argumentation, elite 
political networking, coalition building and cultivating officialdom was progressively to 
reduce barriers to market access. In the process the conditions were created for the emergence 
of an interconnected transnational business elite insistent on free markets yet supportive of 
national differences in governance and culture (Carroll, 2010). 
 
Conclusion 
This paper shows the creation of a global MNC in a nascent industry to be a dynamic, 
politically infused project entailing discourse, struggle and negotiation (Levy, 2008). We 
concur with Geppert and Dörrenbächer (2014: 237) that ‘power is the result of continuously 
socially constructed dynamic relationships among key actors, who make use of existing 
power resources and, in so doing, stabilize and destabilize established power structures’. 
Actor centrality changes over time, and must be regularly renegotiated. Hotel propositions 
were received differently depending on local political contexts, host-actor receptivity 
spanning a broad spectrum from enthusiasm to obstructionism. All negotiations required 
discursive and relational skills to achieve the desired result, especially when host-country 
actors sought to block agreements by leveraging their own sources of power (Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1963). This highlights the importance of social interaction within strategic action 
fields, directing attention to the need to consider how legitimacy is accrued (or eroded) by the 
manner in which MNCs approach their non-market environments (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 
2008). Aligning the interests and ideologies of local field dominants with those of core 
 
 
powerholders in the MNC is a political meaning-making endeavour that involves producing 
shared meaning for home and host stakeholders alike. 
The limitations of this paper include its reliance on a single case example. This raises 
the question whether it is possible to generalize with regard to the development of a global 
industry on the basis of a single case? We suggest that HI represents a unique case worthy of 
consideration in its own right (Eisenhardt, 1989). Our study embraces hotel construction in 
far-flung, politically variegated corners of the globe, including EMEA, the Asia Pacific 
region and the Americas, in assorted cities like Berlin, Istanbul, Tehran, Mexico City and 
Havana, which Hilton sought to unite through a common perspective. It shows how a 
genuinely multinational industry unfolded and came into being in the years following WWII 
(see Tables 2 and 3). Generalization is permissible, we argue, because the rationalized 
management template initiated by HI proved formative to the global industry and survives in 
essence to this day (see Clegg, 2017). Where HI led, others followed, its innovations laying 
the foundations for the industry as presently constituted; planting seeds that have grown into 
large and healthy plants.  
Avenues for future research might include focusing on the use of ideological rhetoric 
in managing ambiguity in MNCs (Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2009). The authoritative 
discourse employed at HI in disparate contexts took seriously the battle for hearts and minds 
in an unpredictable world, striving to reduce ambivalence through the use of ‘great themes’ 
that set a clear political direction while accommodating local diversity (Riad, 2005: 1549). At 
a time when the geo-political uncertainties confronting MNCs are rising and political 
commitment to globalization is vacillating, further research might probe the role of discursive 
ideological sensemaking in MNCs in addressing this uncertainty. 
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Table 1: Typology of ideological-inspired political activities at Hilton International  
Political 
process 
Associated political 
activities  
Target 
constituencies  
Intended business outcomes 
Rhetorically 
intense 
argumentation 
Speeches to elite audiences 
on international hotels, 
politics and business 
circulated to media at home 
and abroad, ideological in 
orientation but also 
reflecting host-country 
issues. 
Elite and non-elite 
mass audiences at 
home and abroad. 
Legitimation. Popular 
support at home and abroad 
for Hilton International 
projects; identifying the 
Hilton brand with modernity, 
internationalism, and 
political, cultural and 
religious tolerance. 
Elite political 
networking 
Public and private support 
for political leaders at home 
and abroad, often 
ideologically inspired. 
Playing host at elite 
political gatherings and 
prestigious events. Personal 
gift giving and social 
intimacy as tokens of 
appreciation and friendship. 
Political leaders at 
home and abroad 
with the authority 
to grant quasi-
official approval to 
individuals, 
enterprises, 
coalitions and 
projects. 
Endorsement. Goodwill and 
support of those with 
political power and 
influence, at home and 
abroad, for projects and 
enabling institutional 
changes, paving the way for 
acceptance by elected and 
appointed officials. 
Coalition 
building 
Making common 
ideological cause with 
national and regional 
business and professional 
elites, at home and abroad, 
to promote projects and 
institutional changes of 
mutual benefit. 
Business and 
professional leaders 
at home and abroad 
with the resources 
needed to deliver 
major projects. 
Proposition. Agreed business 
model, legal framework and 
operational plan for a new 
hotel consistent with relevant 
laws, regulations and 
practices, actual and 
proposed. 
Cultivating 
officialdom 
Seeking ideological 
alignment of gatekeepers at 
home and abroad with 
proposals to secure market 
access on mutually 
beneficial terms.  
Elected and 
appointed 
government 
officials with the 
power to sanction 
deals and grant 
approvals. 
Authorization. Official 
approval and agreed 
conditions of market access 
by means of necessary legal 
sanction, licenses, 
permissions and official 
agreements. 
 
  
 
 
Table 2: Data, themes and political processes 
Illustrative 1st order arguments from Hilton speeches 2nd order themes Aggregate 
processes 
• The essence of communism is the death of the individual and the burial of 
his remains in a collective mass grave (1950). 
• We must let the whole world know what we stand for; Uncle Sam on his 
knees before God, so that he may stand on his feet before the nations, 
proclaiming that the remaining free peoples of the world must not become 
enslaved (1952). 
Anti-communism 
Rhetorically 
intense 
argumentation 
• In the Kremlin, they know where they are going, they have a philosophy, a 
strategy and tactics to steer by ... We must wage peace with the same vigour, 
resoluteness and enthusiasm as we once waged war (1952). 
• Capitalism, economic democracy, political democracy and belief in God are 
germs of good. Let us spread them over the world and infect it with our virus 
of peace and plenty and the love of God and man (1958). 
Battle for 
freedom 
• We are in competition with Soviet Russia for the favour of these countries ... 
Most solemnly I say to you, whoever wins the uncommitted third, wins the 
world! (1958). 
• We have set up what might be called American beachheads [hotels] in key 
positions around the world to thwart the Soviet penetration and further that 
of the free people of the world (1960). 
Uncommitted 
third 
• Through our subsidiary, Hilton International, we set up what we thought of 
as our own Marshall Plan … to help thwart the Soviet penetration of weaker 
nations (1962). 
• We congratulate His Imperial Majesty for pushing these projects forward so 
rapidly …That your government is encouraging visitors from every continent 
and from very nation to come and visit your great country is another sign of 
your progress (1963). 
Political 
messaging 
Elite political 
networking 
• With the building of our new hotel here in Havana we may have stumbled 
upon a new world of economic opportunity and industrial cooperation 
(1958). 
• World-wide business demands that the businessman be more reflective … 
besides being responsible for the economic well-being of people, business is 
also involved in their social, civic, cultural and even political well-being 
(1963). 
Business 
messaging 
• [I wish] to express to you men of Berlin and West Germany my sincere 
appreciation for your great initiative and splendid cooperation with our 
people of the Hilton Corporation during the past three years (1958). 
• We pledge ourselves to operate in manner worthy of this metropolis [Cairo] 
… Your own government and your own fellow-citizens arranged the 
financing to build and furnish the Nile Hilton (1959). 
Official 
messaging 
• We in the Hilton organization move confidently over the world with our 
flags from Cairo to Beverly Hills … happy to wave our flag of freedom 
defiantly against communism (1956). 
• Why have we signed contracts for hotels in every danger spot in the Orient? 
Because there is a job to be done there? And I tell you frankly, guns and 
planes will not get the job done (1956). 
Ideological 
bonding 
Coalition building 
• American economic policy is to help other countries of the free world to help 
themselves … the techniques of hotel administration developed in this 
country are part of this program (1954). 
• Economic aid given to under-developed areas, whether by Western 
government or by Western private capital, is not only a definite means of 
national security, it is concrete proof of our concept that all men are brothers 
(1956). 
Economic 
bonding 
• The Western world owes a debt of gratitude to Spain … she stands on a 
glorious pedestal … the only nation in the world which has defeated 
Communism (1953). 
Political bonding 
 
 
• If we would succeed in Asia, we must have Japan on our side politically, 
militarily and economically … Japan is to Asia what Germany is to Europe, 
and the communists have good reason to want both (1956). 
• Ninety-nine percent of the employees in our international hotels are always 
native to the land in which the hotel is located (1956). 
• This year we shall open twelve new hotels. They represent an investment of 
more than 200 million dollars and will create 12,000 new jobs (1963). 
Investment  and 
employment 
advantages 
Cultivating 
officialdom 
• American hotels will stimulate the spending of the tourist dollar … 
American business can make a concrete contribution to the economy of 
friendly nations (1951). 
• Our method is to increase the flow of travellers between nations … bringing 
needed foreign currency to countries and the world (1963). 
Foreign exchange 
advantages 
• Our objective is to infect the bloodstream of the world with the virus of free-
enterprise, so that other nations of the world might lift themselves up as we 
have done (1959). 
• Hilton International is more than a profit-making enterprise. Our basic 
philosophy is World Peace through International Trade and Travel. We 
believe that free enterprise can contribute a great deal to the world by the 
pursuit of this ideal (1965). 
Systemic 
advantages 
 
  
 
 
Table 3: Political messages delivered by Conrad Hilton at hotel opening ceremonies 
Hotel/ 
Year 
Attending 
Dignitaries 
 
Political Context 
 
Political Sensemaking 
Madrid, 
Spain 
(1953) 
José Finat y Escrivá 
de Romani, Mayor of 
Madrid; Leopoldo 
Eijo y Garay, Bishop 
of Madrid 
Authoritarian regime in 
Spain led by General 
Francisco Franco tainted by 
former association with 
fascist Germany and Italy. 
Spain, led by Franco, ‘is the only 
nation in the world which has 
defeated communism’ and should be 
accepted as a trusted ally (HIA, 
1953). 
Istanbul, 
Turkey 
(1955) 
Fahrettin Kerim 
Gokay, Mayor of 
Istanbul; Celal 
Bayar, wife of 
Turkish President 
US supported anti-
communist Democratic Party 
government and Turkey’s 
admission to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), 1952. 
‘Turkey’s determined resistance to 
totalitarian tactics’ make it ‘of 
increasing importance in cementing 
relations between West and East’ and 
a strong ally of US and Europe (HIA, 
1955). 
Mexico 
City, 
Mexico 
(1956) 
Miguel Alemán 
Valdés, ex-President 
of Mexico; Manuel 
Suárez y Suárez, 
entrepreneur 
member of  the 
ruling elite 
Friction between US and 
Mexico stemming from 
President Ruiz Cortines’ 
refusal to sanction US-led 
overthrow of government of 
Guatemala, 1954.  
‘Regardless of regrettable differences 
in the past’ never have relations 
between Mexico and been better; 
they ‘must and shall go forward in a 
spirit of mutual trust and 
cooperation’ (HIA, 1956d). 
Havana, 
Cuba  
(1958) 
José Suárez Rivas, 
Cuban Minister of 
Labour; Marta 
Fernandez Miranda 
de Batista, wife of 
Cuban President 
Authoritarian government of 
Cuba led by Fulgencio 
Batista had US support but 
under attack from 
revolutionary socialist 
opposition led by Castro.  
Opportunity exists in Cuba for labour 
and capital to create ‘a new weapon 
with which to fight communism … 
[our project] gives the lie to Marx, 
communism and all they stand for’ 
(HIA, 1958c).  
Berlin, 
Germany 
(1958) 
Willy Brandt, 
Governing Mayor of 
Berlin; Hermann 
Lindrath, Federal 
Minister of Public 
Holdings 
Partitioned in 1945, Berlin 
was symbolic epicentre of 
the Cold War. In 1958 
tensions running high when 
Soviet President Khrushchev 
demanded US military leave 
Berlin within six months. 
Berlin at the centre of a great 
worldwide struggle. ‘This great hotel 
of yours is a symbol of the world’s 
confidence in that unification … 
when there is but one Berlin and one 
Germany’ (HIA, 1958d). 
Cairo, 
Egypt 
(1959) 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, 
President of Egypt; 
Josip Broz Tito, 
President of 
Yugoslavia. 
Nationalist President Gamal 
Abdel Nasser precipitated 
international crisis by taking 
over the Franco-British Suez 
canal company, 1956. 
President Nasser, ‘like [George] 
Washington is a man sincerely 
devoted to the advancement of his 
country, to the freedom and uplifting 
of his people’. Should be supported 
by US (HIA, 1959d). 
Tehran, 
Iran 
(1963) 
Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi, Shah of Iran 
Modernizing Shah survived 
major crisis by deposing 
popular nationalist Prime 
Minster Mosaddegh with US 
support, 1953. 
Shah must be congratulated ‘for 
pushing forward these projects [for 
modernization] so rapidly.’ Iran has 
much to give by embracing best of 
‘East and West’ (HIA, 1963a). 
Athens, 
Greece 
(1963) 
Constantine 
Karamanlis, Prime 
Minister of Greece; 
Chrysostomos II, 
Archbishop of 
Athens 
Following defeat of 
communists in civil war, 
1949, Greece joined NATO, 
1952, and pro-capitalist 
conservative politicians had 
seemingly firm grip on 
power. 
Greek people had been on the front 
line in throwing ‘the communists out 
of your homeland’ in 1949. Time has 
now come to fully integrate the 
country into fraternity of capitalist 
nations (HIA, 1963b). 
  
 
 
Table 4: Mean project delivery times by ownership and location, 1949‒67* 
 
Global region 
Mean development times (months) 
Private Public All hotels 
Europe, Middle East & 
Africa 
N = 9 
Mean = 107.0 
N = 10 
Mean = 69.9 
N = 19 
Mean = 87.5 
North, Central and South 
America & Caribbean 
N = 12 
Mean = 58.7 
N = 6 
Mean = 54.3 
N = 18 
Mean = 57.2 
 
Asia Pacific 
N = 4 
Mean = 94.8 
N = 1 
Mean = 45.0 
N = 5 
Mean = 84.8 
 
All hotels 
N = 25 
Mean = 81.8 
N = 17 
Mean = 60.6 
N = 42 
Mean = 74.2 
*Estimated on basis of data from Annual Reports and Accounts of Hilton Hotels Corporation 
and Hilton International Company and ‘Hilton Hotels around the World: Statistics’ (HIA, 
1965). Development times defined as from non-binding provisional agreement to hotel 
opening. Includes Havana Hilton opened in 1958 and nationalized in 1959, hence 42 hotels 
against the 41 operational in 1967 shown in Table 1. 
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